Funding is the clearest thing in crypto to measure and one of the least often measured over a long
window. Every eight hours a perpetual futures contract settles a payment between longs and shorts,
the exchange publishes the rate, and the record of those rates goes back to the beginning. If you have ever seen a
delta-neutral yield quoted, that number is where it came from.
So we added it up. Ten contracts, 2020 through August 2026, 777 monthly files, nothing excluded.
1. What the number actually is
When funding is positive, longs pay shorts. A position that is long the coin and short the
perpetual against it collects that payment and does not care which way the price goes. Summing the
published rate across a year gives what that position would have received, before anything else.
That last phrase is carrying weight, and section 5 is about how much.
2. Year by year, the median contract
| Year | Median funding | Contracts that were positive | Median share of settlements that were negative |
|---|
| 2020 | 14.1% | 8 of 10 | 14.9% |
| 2021 | 38.0% | 10 of 10 | 6.6% |
| 2022 | 0.4% | 5 of 10 | 36.9% |
| 2023 | 8.1% | 9 of 10 | 13.1% |
| 2024 | 13.6% | 9 of 10 | 9.1% |
| 2025 | 4.2% | 9 of 10 | 22.7% |
| 2026 | 1.3% | 8 of 10 | 34.8% |
The last row is eight months, not twelve, and is not scaled up.
Two things move together down that table. The amount shrinks, and the share of settlements running
the other way grows. In 2021 the median contract paid something on roughly nineteen settlements in
twenty. In 2026 it is closer to two in three.
3. The same story on the largest contracts
| Year | BTC | ETH |
|---|
| 2020 | 17.2% | 27.5% |
| 2021 | 30.6% | 37.5% |
| 2022 | 4.2% | 0.8% |
| 2023 | 7.9% | 8.3% |
| 2024 | 12.0% | 13.0% |
| 2025 | 5.1% | 4.9% |
| 2026 | 1.7% | 1.0% |
BTC in 2021 was 18.0 times what BTC has paid across the first eight months of 2026. On ETH, the
share of settlements that were negative was 4.1% in 2021 and is 32.8% in 2026.
Neither of those is a crash. It is a compression, and it has been running for years with one clear
interruption upward in 2024.
4. What a bad year looks like
The table above makes 2022 look merely flat at 0.4%. It was not flat, it was two-sided.
That year half the contracts finished negative, meaning a position holding spot against a short
perpetual paid for the privilege all year rather than being paid. SOL paid out 38.0% over 2022.
BNB was negative in four consecutive years, 2022 through 2025.
This matters more than the headline, because a carry position is usually sized as though the
payment is the safe part. On these contracts the payment itself reversed for a year at a time.
Short-term, 2026 is the second-most two-sided year in the sample: a median of 34.8% of settlements
went the wrong way, and on XRP it was 51.3% and on SOL 50.5%. More than half of the settlements on
those two contracts were paid by the carry position rather than to it.
5. This is gross, and gross is the smaller problem
Everything above is the published funding rate and nothing else. It does not include exchange fees
on either leg, the spread paid getting in and out, the cost of the dollars funding the spot side, or
the basis between spot and the perpetual at entry and exit. It also assumes the position is simply
held, with no rebalancing of the hedge as the price moves.
Any real version of this pays all of those. That is why the correct way to read the table is as a
ceiling: the most that was available before costs, not what anyone received.
A ceiling of 38.0% leaves room for a lot of friction. A ceiling of 1.3% does not, and that is the
whole point of the measurement. The number did not merely get smaller; it got smaller than the costs
it has to clear, which turns a trade into a subscription to those costs.
6. Why it compressed, which we did not test
The obvious explanation is that more capital arrived to collect it. Funding is a price, and it is
high when there is more leveraged demand for long exposure than there is balance sheet willing to
take the other side. Products that systematically take the other side have grown a great deal since
2021.
That is a plausible mechanism and we have not tested it. Our measurement establishes the compression;
it says nothing about the cause. If you see this chart attached to a confident causal story, the
story is someone's opinion attached to our kind of number.
Limitations
Ten contracts is a small and deliberately chosen sample, and all ten exist today. Contracts that were
delisted are not in it, which biases the picture toward survivors. The effect on funding
specifically is unclear rather than obviously favourable, but it is a selection and it should be
stated.
One exchange, one margin type. These are USDT-margined perpetuals on a single venue. Coin-margined
contracts, other venues and other quote currencies can and do differ.
Funding settles every 8 hours on these contracts for almost the whole window. The SOL contract in
2022 shows a mixture of intervals in the published record, so its settlement counts for that year
are not directly comparable to the others; the summed rate is unaffected.
Summing the rate is not compounding a return. It answers how much funding accrued, which is the
question people mean, but it is not a portfolio simulation and should not be compared directly to a
compounded yield.
The 2026 figure covers eight months. It is presented as an eight-month sum throughout and is never
annualised, because annualising a partial year in a compressing series would overstate it.